An Experimental Contribution to the Theory of Customary (International) Law by Christoph Engel
MAX PLANCK SOCIETY
Preprints of the
Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2010/13
An Experimental 
Contribution to the 
Theory of Customary 
(International) Law
Christoph EngelPreprints of the 
Max Planck Institute 
for Research on Collective Goods  Bonn 2010/13
An Experimental Contribution to the 
Theory of Customary (International) Law
Christoph Engel
April 2010
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn 
http://www.coll.mpg.de  1
An Experimental Contribution to the  








In their majority, public international lawyers postulate that for a new rule of customary law to 
originate, two conditions must be fulfilled: there must be consistent practice, and it must be 
shown that this practice is motivated by the belief that such behaviour is required in law. Mau-
rice Mendelson (Recueil des Cours 272 (1998) 155) has challenged this view. He believes that 
the majority view ignores the fundamentally incomplete nature of public international law. He 
claims that the new rule emerges because mere practice leads to convergent expectations. This 
paper uses data from student experiments with a linear public good to show that behaviour con-
verges even absent verbal communication; that convergence is guided by mean contributions in 
the previous round, which serve as an implicit norm; that freeriding on this implicit norm is re-
garded as illegitimate; that cooperation can be stabilised at a high level if “reprisals” are permit-
ted. Hence the mechanism of norm formation proposed by Maurice Mendelson is fully borne out 
by the experimental data. 
JEL: C91, D03, D23, F53, H41, K33 
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I.  A Proper Concept of Customary (International) Law 
Experimental public international law? Isn’t it patent that such an endeavour is doomed to fail-
ure? Field experiments are ruled out in the first place; no state will agree to be treated at random, 
which would be necessary for identification. And isn’t it obvious that a lab experiment with, say, 
student subjects is miles away from the problems states have to deal with? Yes and no. As with 
any experiment on law, external validity is an issue. In the discussion part of the paper I will ad-
dress the challenge. Yet in the most fundamental respect, public international law is closer to the 
deliberately and radically context-free setting of the lab than any rule of domestic law. Public 
international law is more primitive, in the evolutionary sense. It lacks sovereignty. For sure, the 
addressees of public international law are sovereign states. Yet their sovereignty is confined to 
themselves. They have potentially unlimited rule making power internally, and in their dealings 
with each other they (grosso modo) respect each other’s sovereign immunity. If they sign a 
treaty, this treaty can be said to rest in the combined sovereignties of the concluding parties. Yet 
above the level of states, there is no supreme authority that could ordain, let alone force, states to 
play by the rules, not even by those rules to which they have explicitly assented. 
The absence of a supreme ruler explains why one source of law features prominently here that 
has almost died out in municipal law: customary law. In most textbooks of public international 
law, this source of law is treated much the same way as the sources of law in the introductory 
books on municipal law. In such texts, customary international law is tied back to a meta-rule 
that precisely defines the conditions under which a new rule of customary law comes into being. 
Textbooks typically list two conditions: sufficiently long and intense practice, and “opinio iuris”. 
The latter requires that consistent practice results from the conviction of those contributing to it 
to be obliged in law (for a summary treatment see Treves 2009).  
In his Hague lectures, Maurice Mendelson sharply criticises this approach (Mendelson 1998). 
For him, the textbook approach misses the categorical difference between municipal and public 
international law. The latter legal order is “semi-anarchic” (166), embryonic, and in a deep way 
incomplete. “Whilst modern domestic societies are characterised by highly centralised and com-
pulsory systems of law-making and adjudication, not to mention enforcement, international soci-
ety is not like that” (168). Therefore a “formalistic approach” (168) is misplaced. It is not possi-
ble to state in an abstract way the conditions that must be fulfilled for a new rule of customary 
international law to come into being (172). “The characteristic of this kind of law is that it is not 
just unwritten, it is informal” (172). “The customary process is in fact a continuous one, which 
does not stop when the rule has emerged […]. Even after the rule has ’emerged’, every act of 
compliance will strengthen it, and every violation, if acquiesced in, will help to undermine it” 
(175). Customary international law rests on the conviction that “states should comply with the 
legitimate expectations of the international community”, where the ambiguity of the term “ex-
pectation” is deliberate: “If, within a social group, people habitually behave in a certain way, 
then, particularly if others rely on the continuation of this conduct, the sentiment may develop 
within that society that one is obliged to continue so to act. In other words, a norm emerges from   3
what is normal […]. If the generality of states has regularly behaved in certain ways […], then a 
legitimate expectation arises that they will continue to do so” (185 f.). 
These are testable propositions. Maurice Mendelson himself does not make a claim that is con-
fined to international relations. He refers to a process “within a social group” (185). It therefore 
is meaningful to overcome the impossibility of testing states in the lab by studying the underly-
ing social mechanism in an artificially created society with readily available subjects. To that 
end, this paper reanalyses a rich dataset composed of partly our own data, and partly data from 
structurally identical experiments run in labs all over the world. 
The paper is in the spirit of those who have set out to analyse public international law in general 
(Keohane 2002; Van Aaken, Engel et al. 2008), and customary international law in particular, 
with the apparatus of rational choice theory. Such approaches assume that states are actors, that 
states (and not only individuals within states) have identifiable interests, and that states strive for 
realising their preferences, given the constraints resulting from international relations (Goldsmith 
and Posner 2005). Yet this paper does not explain the emergence of new rules of customary in-
ternational law in game theoretic terms, as (Goldsmith and Posner 1999; Chinen 2001; Swaine 
2002; Norman and Trachtman 2005; Norman and Trachtman 2008). While this explanation defi-
nitely has value, this paper stresses the implicit character of the norm generation process, and its 
evolutionary nature. 
The paper is even closer to those who claim that state action is, at least partly, guided by the 
forces of “acculturation” (Goodman and Jinks 2004; Goodman and Jinks 2008). Yet these ap-
proaches explain norm emergence and norm compliance with a much richer set of contributing 
factors, both individualistic and social. While they distinguish acculturation and (more explicit, 
more intrusive) persuasion, they insist that acculturation is backed up by (social) sanctions, like 
shaming or public approval. By contrast, this paper treats sanctions as an additional explanatory 
variable, not as a necessary component of the underlying process. In a more sociological spirit, 
acculturation is understood as the process of becoming initiated to a group. By contrast, this pa-
per stays as individualistic as possible. Since group composition is random, interaction is 
anonymous, and action is the only communication channel, one may wonder whether it makes 
sense to speak of culture in the first place. At any rate, the role of culture is a minimal as possi-
ble. This paper may thus be read as a radicalisation of the acculturation thesis: to the extent that 
one can show norms to even emerge in this radically decontextualised setting, they may a forti-
ori be expected to emerge in the considerably richer institutional setting of international rela-
tions. 
II.  Defining the Governance Problem 
In legal textbooks, the sources of law are presented in a way that deliberately abstracts from their 
substance. When dealing with domestic law, this is a useful intellectual division of labour. The 
rules on rules deal with the formal conditions under which an act of legislature acquires validity.   4
Since states are sovereign, they are in principle free to give the new rule whatever contents the 
legislator deems fit. The constitution may prohibit certain rules, in particular through the protec-
tion of fundamental freedoms. Yet this possibility does not affect the abstract rules that define 
the sources of law. 
If one follows Maurice Mendelson, this must be different with customary law. The emergence of 
a new rule rests on the conviction of those arguably participating in the informal process of cre-
ating it that a certain conduct is to be expected. What is to be expected, and therefore how a cer-
tain practice is to be interpreted, depends on the character of the problem the purported rule is 
meant to solve.  
The quintessential social problem for the solution of which the emergence of norms is instru-
mental is a social dilemma. In the most general terms a dilemma is a situation in which individ-
ual and social rationality fall apart. What would be best for society is not in the best interest of 
the individual. In terms of game theory, this statement can be made precise and testable (for in-
troductions see Baird, Gertner et al. 1994; Scharpf 1997), (for applications to international rela-
tions see Holzinger 2003; Sandler 2004). The experiments reported here all model the dilemma 
the same way. They implement a linear public good (for an overview of the experimental litera-
ture on these games, see Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003). This class of problems is frequent in in-
ternational relations. Two classic examples are the maintenance of peace, and measures to com-
bat climate change.  
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Participant i  has payoff π . In every round, she receives endowment e. She is free to keep it, or 
to invest all or part of her endowment in a public project. Investment has linear cost  i c  and return 
1 < µ . However, all contributions of all n members of the group are not only beneficial for her-
self, but also for all other group members, with  1 > µ n . Consequently, the group as a whole is 
best off if all participants invest their entire endowments. However, individually each group 
member makes the highest profit if only the remaining members contribute while she freerides. 
Therefore in the one-shot game, game theory predicts that all players contribute nothing. This 
prediction is not changed by the fact that the game has been repeated in all experiments. For the 
number of rounds was always announced in advance. In the last round, the prediction from the 
one-shot game obviously applies. Players holding standard preferences anticipate this and pre-
empt being exploited in the last round by defecting themselves in the penultimate round. 
Through perfect anticipation, this step is repeated, so that in the model all defect right from the 
beginning (Selten 1978; Rosenthal 1981).    5
III. The  Data 
Table 1 summarises the data set. Four experiments exactly implement the game as presented in 
the previous paragraph, with parameters  4 , 4 . , 20 = = = n e µ . In this literature, this design is called a 
voluntary contribution mechanism. The remaining five experiments allow for decentral punish-
ment. What this means and which punishment technologies are implemented will be explained 
below. Three experiments are from our own lab (denoted MPI; for further detail see 
(Beckenkamp, Engel et al. 2009)). Four experiments have been run in London (denoted NIK, for 
further detail see (Nikiforakis 2008)). One experiment is from Rennes (denoted DEN, (Denant-
Boèment, Masclet et al. 2007)). The final dataset consists of 16 identical experiments run in labs 
all over the world (denoted HER, (Herrmann, Thöni et al. 2008)). All but one experiment had 10 
announced rounds; in the one exception, the game lasted 12 announced rounds. The dataset 
comprises a total of 14720 data points, collected from 1440 subjects interacting in 360 groups of 
four. In all but two experiments, the groups stayed together for the entire game (so-called partner 
design). In the remaining two experiments, groups were re-matched every round (so-called 
stranger design). All experiments were computerised, using the software zTree (Fischbacher 
2007). In our own experiments, we invited subjects using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 
In all experiments, participants interacted anonymously. Payoffs were paid out at the end of the 
game in real money. 
 
game-type matching dataset #  obs. T P 
techn. 
VCM P  MPI  240  10  - 
VCM P  NIK  960  10  - 
VCM P  MPI  480  12  - 
VCM S  NIK  960  10  - 
Pun P  DEN  480  10  FG 
Pun P  MPI  240  10  FG 
Pun P  NIK  480  10  FG 
Pun P  HER  10400  10  1:3 




IV.  What is the Problem and What is the Solution? 
Figure 1 contrasts the aggregate experimental finding (the blue line) with the theoretical predic-
tion (the green line). On average, in the beginning participants contribute much more than the 
theoretical expectation of zero. Contributions slowly but steadily decline. Yet as the error bars 
show, even at the end of the game, contributions are still significantly above the theoretical pre-
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Development of Contributions in an Institution Free Setting 
 
As always with experimental data, there is heterogeneity between groups. Yet as Figure 2 shows, 
the main finding is fairly robust. In no group, contributions are zero in the first period. Full con-
tributions occur (groups 18, 19, 23, 412, 415), but eventually cooperation breaks down. Upward 
movements may occur for a limited number of periods, but a longer positive trend is very rare 
(see groups 416, 415, 418). The typical picture is substantial contributions in the beginning, and 
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VCM: Individual Groups   7
Figure 3 looks at the initial period more closely. In this period, no more than 15.63 % of all 160 
participants are in line with the theoretical prediction and contribute nothing to the joint project. 





































VCM: Period 1 Contributions 
 
Given these findings, it is almost a philosophical question what is the problem and what is the 
solution. One may say that the problem is imperfect cooperation, but one may in as well say that 
imperfect defection is the solution. 
Let us now explore the imperfection. As one directly sees in Figure 1, contributions decay over 
time. The negative time trend is statistically significant. In 39 of 40 independent groups, the 
mean change from one period to another is negative.











                                        
2   A one-sample signrank test of the nul hypothesis that this mean is zero rejects at z = -5.498, p < .0001. 
3   Parametric estimation of this data is demanding. Each participant decides repeatedly, which is why a fixed or 
random effects model is in order. Many participants contribute 20, quite a few contribute 0. Therefore the 
data is left and right censored, which calls for a Tobit model. Finally, since the groups of four stay together 
throughout the game, standard errors must be corrected for this relatedness. Unfortunately, there is no sand-
wich estimator for random effects Tobit models, which is why I bootstrap the models, with drawings at the 
level of groups. Finally, I perform the Hausman test on the mirror model that ignores clustering and censor-
ing. In this model, the test turns out insignificant, which is why I am justified to use the more efficient ran-





left censored  551 
right censored 266 
p model  <.001 
Table 2 
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism: Time Trend 
random effects Tobit, bootstrapped at the group level, 50 reps 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
As Figure 4 shows, the overall negative trend results from a negative balance. There are also 
upward movements, in particular in reaction to experiences from the first period. Yet downward 
movements are both more frequent and more pronounced. Over all periods, in all but one group 
there is a negative trend. From period 1 to 2, 8 from 40 groups move up, while 26 move down 






















Time Trend in Initial Periods 
 
 
V.  Is There a Norm? 
Thus far, we have only seen that there is a trend. There is a regularity. As Figure 1 shows, stan-
dard errors are relatively small, but they do not substantially reduce over time. In that sense, we 
cannot even claim to see convergence. Yet these are statements regarding the unconditional de-
velopment. Maurice Mendelson has made a more ambitious claim: norms emerge by the very 
fact that mutual expectations match. In the experiments, verbal communication is excluded. The 
only way to get at expectations is studying behaviour. Specifically we can investigate how par-  9
ticipants react in the subsequent period to the experiences they have made in the previous period. 
If they had contributed less than the average and if they react by increasing their contributions, 
we can interpret this as an adjustment to the perceived expectation of others to make a higher 
contribution. Mendelson stresses that norms need not adjust upwards. If many do not play by 
what this player believes to be the rule, she may react by herself stopping to abide by it. In our 
setting, we do have a continuous variable, so that participants can also gradually reduce their 
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Figure 5 
Contribution Changes, Conditional on Experienced Cooperation 
 
In no group participants who had contributed in period t-1 more than the average of period t-2 on 
average increase their contributions in period t; in 38 of 40 groups they on average reduce their 
contributions.
4 By contrast, in 28 of 39 groups participants who had contributed in period t-1 less 
than the average of period t-2 on average increase their contributions in period t.
5 The result is 
confirmed by the parametric fixed effects models in Table 3. The negative constant reflects the 
fact that, overall, contributions decay over time. Note that, for those who contributed in t-1 less 
than the average in t-2, the independent variable is negative. Therefore the negative regressor 
implies that such participants increase their contributions, the more so the more they had been 





                                        
4   One sample signrank test, z = - 5.491, p < .0001. 
5   One sample signrank test of the nul that they do not change their contributions, z = 4.082, p < .0001.   10





in previous period 
distance from average -.508***  -.618*** 
cons -1.162***  -1.530*** 
N 715  475 
R
2 within  .1159  .0716 
R
2 between  .0854  .3730 
R
2 overall  .1185  .1429 
p model  .0004  <.0001 
Table 3 
Reaction to Distance from Group Mean 
fixed effects, clustered at group level 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
 
In opposition to the doctrinal mainstream, Maurice Mendelson urges public international lawyers 
to not require proof of opinio iuris. He believes the legitimacy of expectations results from mere 
practice. With our data, we can test whether mere practice suffices to generate both consistent 
behaviour and a normative expectation.  
Opinio iuris critically presupposes discourse. Some states must claim that this is the law. Others 
must explicitly agree, or at least not object to the explicit claim. Our setting excludes explicit 
communication by design. If we nonetheless find action motivated by perceived legitimacy, we 
have shown Maurice Mendelson’s claim to be true. We have an indirect measure for perceived 
legitimacy. Below we will be investigating how behaviour develops if participants are given a 
chance to express disapproval through costly punishment. We then will interpret decentral pun-
ishment as a (very embryonic) institutional intervention. At this point, we are only interested in 
the expressive function of punishment. In earlier periods, we cannot disentangle the “deontic” 
and the “consequentialist” functions of punishment. A player may punish because she hopes for 
a positive effect on contributions in subsequent periods, and exerts punishment effort as an in-
vestment into cooperativeness, in her group. Or she may punish because she is a retributionist 
and thinks a freerider deserves a sanction. Yet in the last period of the game, punishment can no 
longer be forward looking. If there is punishment, it must serve an expressive function. The pun-
isher sends a signal of her discontent with the behaviour of another participant. If punishment in 
the last round is sensitive to the deviation from the contribution level in the penultimate round, 
punishment demonstrates that punishers regard negative deviations from the norm as unfair. 
They interpret the contribution level as a normative expectation. 
First, Figure 6 demonstrates that in the last period punishment is still substantial. Actually, nei-
ther non-parametrically nor parametrically, there is a significant difference between the intensity 
of punishment in earlier and in the last period.
6 This shows that punishment cannot be exclu-
sively instrumental.  
                                        
6   Mann Whitney, mean punishment in earlier periods vs. punishment in the final period, per group, N = 576, p 
= .1234; random effects Tobit, depvar: received punishment, indepvar: dummy = 1 if last period, coef. .283, 
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Intensity of Punishment Throughout and at the End of the Game 
 
In the next step, Figure 7 shows that punishment in the final period is indeed sensitive to the de-
gree by which the punishee deviates from the average contribution in this period, i.e. to the de-
gree of freeriding. This finding too is statistically significant.
7 We do indeed establish the 
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Figure 7 
Sensitivity of Punishment in the Final Period to Degree of Freeriding 
 
                                        
7   Random effects Tobit, depvar: decision of participant a to punish participant b, in the last period of the game, 
N = 480, coef. (contr b – mean contr) -.271, p < .0001, cons -4.307, p <.0001, p model <.0001, Hausman test 
insignificant on mirror model that ignores censoring.   12
VI.  Norms Are Context Contingent 
From the concept of customary law suggested by Maurice Mendelson, it directly follows that the 
contents of customary rules is context contingent. If, at a certain point in time, say after the end 
of a large war, a vast majority of states believes time is ripe for a number of rules meant to make 
it more difficult to go to war, rules will emerge that would have been very unlikely to form in a 
different period of time. In principle, customary rules can also be contingent on geography. Ad-
mittedly, the typical rule of customary international law is universal. But it is undisputed that the 
geographic scope of customary international law may be more narrow. Then custom may emerge 
in some region, and not in others.
8 There are for instance a number of customary rules whose 
field of application is confined to Latin America, for instance with respect to asylum. 
Context contingency can be tested in the lab, and using experimental data the concept of context 
contingency can be made more precise. Two related sources of contingency exist in the experi-
mental data on voluntary contribution mechanisms. Not all experimental participants are equal. 
These idiosyncrasies interact to produce characteristics of each randomly composed experimen-
tal group.  
Let us start with the second. In so doing, we operationalise context by past interaction patterns, 
within the group of which a participant happens to be a member. In the standard public goods 
experiment, those participants who are to form a group for the next 10 periods do not know each 
other's identity. Interaction is fully anonymous. The only channel of communication is action. 
Therefore the only possibility for forming a group is the contribution pattern. Actually according 
to the protocol used by the experiments reported in this paper, participants do not even learn the 
individual behaviour of other participants. All they see is their own payoff, from which they can 
deduct the average contribution in the respective period.
9  
Participants are very likely to use this information. Figure 8 demonstrates that one piece of in-
formation organises the data very well. The mean contribution in the first round is a very good 
predictor for contributions in later rounds. The degree of cooperativeness participants experience 
in the first round sets the stage. Participants gain a sense of what is feasible in this setting (more 
from Beckenkamp, Engel et al. 2009). Actually, in the graph most dots are below the line. This 
should not come as a surprise. Since Figure 1 shows that it is normal, in this game, for contribu-
tions to decay over time, the mean contribution in later rounds must typically be smaller than the 
mean contribution in the initial round. The interesting message is that most of these points are 
more or less in parallel to the line, as demonstrated by the regression line. Again, the graphical 
impression is corroborated by statistical analysis.
10 For a parametric test see Table 4. 
                                        
8   ICJ Rep. 1950, 266, 277 – Asylum; Restatement (3
rd) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 102. 
9   This too is different with punishment. Then each participant in each period sees how much each other group 
member has contributed. However group members are not identified across periods, and they of course re-
main anonymous. 
10   Spearman’s rho of mean contributions per group in periods 2-10 with average contributions, in this group, in 
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Figure 8 
Effect of First Impressions 
 
contribution in periods > 1   
mean contribution in period 1 1.388*** 





p model  <.001 
Table 4 
Effect of First Impressions 
random effects Tobit, bootstrapped at the group level, 50 reps 
Hausman test on mirror model insignificant 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
Group heterogeneity does of course not fall from heaven. It is the product of the heterogeneity of 
group members. There are several possibilities for characterising group members. If one aims at 
explaining the group mean in the first period, unconditional first round contributions are the right 
measure. It however is even more revealing to consider conditional types. In principle, type 
should matter throughout the game. Hence if one were only interested in classification, one 
would want to use all data. Yet then type would be endogenous, and could no longer be used for 
explanation. I therefore only use the first three periods for classification. I form three groups: 
those who have in both periods been above the group mean of the respective previous period 
(whom I call “altruists”); those who have in both periods been below the group mean of the re-
spective previous period (whom I call “freeriders”), and the intermediate group. I call them 
“conditional cooperators” since either they have just given the average from the previous period, 
or their contribution has oscillated around the group average of the previous period. Note that 
there are more direct measures of conditional cooperation (Fischbacher, Gächter et al. 2001; Fis-
chbacher and Gächter 2010). Yet since these measures have not been employed in the experi-
ments reported here, I must revert to the described proxy.   14
As Figure 9 highlights, players do indeed exhibit behavioural patterns throughout the game. 
Those whom I have classified as freeriders are more likely to give nothing in later rounds. They 
very rarely give more than 10 points. By contrast, those whom I have classified as altruists are 
least likely to give nothing, and they are fairly likely to contribute more than 10 points. In both 
respects, those whom I have classified as conditional cooperators are in the middle (but giving 
everything is also pronounced with them). Non-parametrically, the difference in means between 
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classification: contr[2] and contr[3], compared to mean contr [t-1]




Effect of Player Type on Contributions in Later Rounds 
Since any classification draws artificial lines, it is even safer to perform a classification free sta-
tistical test. The model of Table 5 directly works with the difference between this player’s con-
tributions in periods 2 and 3, compared to the average contribution, in her group, in the antece-
dent period. Independently, both the generosity of a subject in periods 2 and 3 significantly 
explain contributions in later rounds. Both coefficients are positive, indicating that cooperative-
ness early on is predictive of cooperativeness later in the game. Conversely, the model predicts 
that participants who were below the group average in early periods will also be below the aver-












                                        
11   Mann Whitney, freerider vs. conditional cooperator, N = 61, p = .0108; freerider vs. altruist, N = 55, p = 
.0114.   15
contribution in 
periods 4 – 10 
 
contr [2] – avcontr [1] .414** 




p model  <.0001 
Table 5 
Classification Free Test of Player Type Influence on Behaviour 
random effects Tobit, bootstrapped at the group level, 50 reps 
Hausman test on mirror model insignificant 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
VII.  A More Demanding Norm 
From the perspective of norm theory, we have all we need. There are behavioural regularities. 
These regularities guide behaviour. Both from above and from below, in an experiment partici-
pants adjust their contribution level to the mean contribution in their group, in the previous pe-
riod. Participants do so since they interpret contributions in the previous period as an implicit 
norm. The contents of the norm is contingent on first impressions, which in turn result from the 
idiosyncratic type of the individuals that happen to form a group. 
Yet from a policy perspective, the result is disappointing. On average, the longer their behaviour 
is guided by the implicit norm, the less groups are able to overcome their dilemma. Let us first 
show that a majority of participants feels this way. Figure 10 shows that all classes of partici-
pants (classified the same way as in Figure 9) sometimes contribute more than the average of the 
previous round. In conditional cooperators and altruists, such behaviour is even quite frequent.
12 
This makes only sense if these participants hope that, at least in the long run, others will follow 
suit. Overcommitment can thus be interpreted as an investment into the establishment of a more 
demanding implicit norm. This implies that the implicit norm does not gradually decay, because 
nobody was willing to support a more ambitious norm. Quite a few participants are even happy 
to sacrifice some personal profit for the purpose. Yet in the totally institution free environment of 
the voluntary contribution mechanism, those in favour of a more stringent norm are not able to 
protect themselves against exploitation by freeriders. 
                                        
12   The difference between freeriders and conditional cooperators (Mann Whitney, N = 61, p = .0074) and be-
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Figure 11 demonstrates that this explanation indeed captures the essential driving force. While 
the red line repeats the earlier characteristic decay in the institution free environment, the blue 
line shows that cooperation stabilises at a fairly high level if participants are given the chance to 
punish each other after they have seen how much each of the other participants has contributed 
to the joint project, in the respective period.
13 Note that for a group of profit maximising partici-
pants, the punishment opportunity would be irrelevant. In the experiment, punishment is costly. 
Even if participants expect punishment (rightly) to induce a higher contribution level, each indi-
vidual participant maximises her profit if she leaves it to the remaining group members to disci-
pline freeriders, while she enjoys the higher period profit free of charge. The original dilemma 
thus repeats when it comes to disciplining the group (Heckathorn 1989). The difference in con-
tributions is highly significant, even in a nonparametric test over means per group.
14 By a similar 




                                        
13   Table 1 specifies the punishment technology. In four experiments, following (Fehr and Gächter 2000), the 
following cost function was used: 
 
  By contrast (Herrmann, Thöni et al. 2008) use the linear technology originally introduced by (Fehr and 
Gächter 2002). According to this scheme, one punishment point destroys three points in the addressee. 
14   Mann Whitney, N = 336, p < .0001; the difference is also significant if we only compare results from the 22 
groups of our own lab, p = .0063, i.e. if we test Figure 11. 
15   Mann Whitney, N = 22, p = .0008. The dependent variable is the coefficient of a random effects model that, 
separately for each group, regresses contributions on period, controlling for the endgame effect through an 
additional regressor for the final period. For comparability, this test too is confined to the partner design data 
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Figure 11 
Contributions with and without Decentral Punishment 
 
Note that the institution that proves so powerful in the lab is fairly close to the intervention states 
may face in international relations if they try to free ride on other states’ efforts for the provision 
of a collective international good. As pointed out above, normally there is neither an authority 
for adjudication nor for enforcement to which a state could refer the dispute if it believes that 
another state violates an obligation under customary international law. All such states can do is 
themselves enforce the purported rule, through reprisals. Of course, the right to reprisals is some-
times abused. On the pretext that a disputed rule of customary law has been violated, a powerful 
state may itself violate an obligation under international law. Yet practically, reprisals are rare. 
This is understandable since an unwarranted reprisal is itself a violation of international law that 
may trigger countermeasures. Therefore what is a pecuniary cost in the lab chiefly is a risk in 
international relations.  
VIII.   Discussion 
Experiments never map reality completely. Since the reality that rules of law are meant to govern 
is particularly rich, external validity tends to be a matter of concern in experiments on legal is-
sues (also see Mendelson 1998:165-167). States are among the most aggregate corporate actors 
to be found on earth. By contrast, in the lab one studies the behaviour of isolated individuals. 
Public international law is an elegant tool for organising collectivities. One signature by the 
president binds 300 Mio Americans. Nonetheless many international conflicts engage a much 
larger number of actors than the four, or six, or eight members of an experimental group. While 
public international law is the offspring of centuries, in the experiments reported here partici-
pants interact for an hour or two. Consequently, historical conflict is absent by design. Injustices 
from the past do only matter if they have been inflicted a few minutes ago. In the experiment, the 
number of repetitions is announced, while in international relations states may not safely predict 
when a bilateral or multilateral relationship will terminate. Public international law deals with 
the essentials of this world, while our experimental subjects bargain over pennies. While in in-  18
ternational relations actors are almost always perfectly identified, the experiments provide per-
fect anonymity. This excludes reputation effects that are central in international relations. By the 
same token, communication is always an option between states, and one regularly seized. An 
important strand of international relations scholarship believes communication, or discourse as 
they tend to put it, is crucial for understanding the emergence of international norms (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Risse 1999; Risse 2000). In contrast, in the experiments verbal communication 
has been excluded. Actions have been the only communication channel. Even if explicit adjudi-
cation is the exception in international relations, it at least is a possibility, while it is excluded by 
design in the experiments. While history has given states very unequal opportunities, in the ex-
periments opportunities are perfectly symmetric for all participants. Finally, in international rela-
tions ultimately no state can be prevented from going to war. Since the option of force goes un-
checked, rights and obligations are never perfectly defined. By contrast, in the experiments each 
player's action space is precisely delineated.  
All these differences certainly matter. Some could be relatively easily tested by new experi-
ments. One could introduce uncertainty about the number of repetitions. Then theory would pre-
dict that cooperation is even easier to sustain (Aumann and Shapley 1994). One could lift ano-
nymity and permit communication. One could make endowments or the action space 
asymmetric. One could introduce ambiguity to capture imperfectly defined property rights. One 
could raise stakes, for instance by playing the game in a developing country with a weak cur-
rency. Yet even if one were to do all that, important differences would remain. True corporate 
actors are next to impossible to implement in the lab (on experimental findings about the behav-
iour of corporate actors see Engel 2008). If one wants to maintain experimental control, true his-
torical contingency is hard to implement as well. Adjudication would only be meaningful if the 
neat design of the opportunity structure were replaced by a sufficiently complex, and hence 
partly unpredictable, setting. Ultimately, one has to accept the trade-off. Experiments make it 
possible to solve the identification problem. If the experiment is properly designed, the arrow of 
causation is undisputed. Omitted variables can also largely be avoided. Yet these advantages 
have a price. Of necessity, the situation tested in the lab is much more naked than the situation in 
the field it is meant to explain. In the case of customary (international) law, this price is worth 
paying. For in the field, one may at best gain an intuition of what happens if a new rule of cus-
tomary law emerges. By contrast, relying on the experiments reported in this paper one is able to 
precisely trace the evolutionary path. As Maurice Mendelson hypothesized, the essence of cus-
tomary law is its evolutionary nature. 
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